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ABSTRACT
Based on data from the European banking stress tests of 2014, 2016 and the transparency exercise of 2018 we demonstrate
for the first time that the latent geometry of financial networks can be well-represented by geometry of negative curvature, i.e.,
by hyperbolic geometry. This allows us to connect the network structure to the popularity-vs-similarity model of Papdopoulos et
al., which is based on the Poincaré disc model of hyperbolic geometry. We show that the latent dimensions of ‘popularity’ and
‘similarity’ in this model are strongly associated to systemic importance and to geographic subdivisions of the banking system.
In a longitudinal analysis over the time span from 2014 to 2018 we find that the systemic importance of individual banks has
remained rather stable, while the peripheral community structure exhibits more (but still moderate) variability.
Introduction
Network models based on hyperbolic geometry have been successful in explaining the structural features of informational1,
social2 and biological networks3. Such models provide a mathematical framework to resolve the conflicting paradigms of
preferential attachment (attraction to popular nodes) and community effects (attraction to similar nodes) in networks.4–6
Just as the geometric structure of a social network determines the diffusion of news, rumors or infective diseases between
individuals7, the geometric structure of a financial network influences the diffusion of financial stress between financial
institutions, such as banks.8–10 Indeed, the lack of understanding for risks originating from the systemic interaction of financial
institutions has been identified as a major contributing factor to the global financial crisis of 2008.11 While many recent studies
have analysed the mechanisms of financial contagion in theoretical or simulation-based settings, less attention has been payed to
the structural and geometric characteristics of real financial networks. In particular, it has remained an open question, whether
the paradigm of hyperbolic structure applies to financial and economic networks and what such a structure implies for financial
contagion processes.
Here, we consider financial networks inferred from bank balance sheet data, as collected and made available by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) within the European banking stress test and transparency exercises of 2014, 2016 and 2018.12, 13 We
show that these networks can be embedded into low-dimensional hyperbolic space with considerably smaller distortion than into
Euclidean space, suggesting that the paradigm of latent hyperbolic geometry also applies to financial networks. Furthermore –
following Papadopoulos et al.4 – we decompose the embedded hyperbolic coordinates into the dimensions of popularity and
similarity and demonstrate that these dimensions align with systemic importance and membership in regional banking clusters
respectively. Finally, the longitudinal structure of the data allows us to track changes in these dimensions over time, i.e., to
track the stability of systemic importance and of the peripheral community structure over time.
Results
Inference of Financial Networks
Contagion in financial networks is a complex process, which can take place through several parallel (and potentially interacting)
mechanisms and channels.14 These mechanisms include direct bank-to-bank liabilities15, bank runs16, and market-mediated
contagion through asset sales14, 17–19 (‘fire-sale contagion’); see also [11, p.21ff]. Here, we focus on the channel of fire-
sale contagion, which has been singled out – both in simulation18 and in empirical studies17 – as a key mechanism of
financial contagion. Moreover, the propensity of fire-sale contagion can be quantified from available balance sheet data, using
liquidity-weighted portfolio overlap (LWPO)19, 20 as an indicator (see Methods for details).
Our inference of financial networks follows a two-stage mechanism: First, we construct a weighted bipartite network
in which banks B = (b1, . . . ,bn) are linked to a common pool of assets A = (a1, . . . ,am), which consist of sovereign bonds
classified by issuing country and by different levels of maturity. In the second step we perform a one-mode projection of
this network on the node set B, using the LWPO of two banks bi,b j ∈ B to determine the weight wi j of the link between the
corresponding nodes. For any of the years y ∈ {2014,2016,2018}, the result is an undirected, weighted network Ny of banks,
in which two banks are connected if and only if they hold common assets. The link weight wi j, normalized to [0,1], represents
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the susceptibility of two banks bi,b j to financial contagion, quantified by their LWPO. The inferred networks are very dense,
i.e., almost all pairs of banks hold some common assets. However, most of the connections have very small weights, and the
networks are dominated by a ‘sparse backbone’ of a few strong connections, which represent the dominant channels of potential
contagion of financial distress; see Figure 1.A.
Latent network geometry
Figure 1. Panel A: Edge weight distribution in the EBA
Networks of years 2014, 2016 and 2018. The inter-decile range
of the (highly skewed) distributions is indicated in red.
Panel B: Stress of network embedding into Euclidean vs.
Hyperbolic geometry. Lower values of stress indicate better
goodness-of-fit.
Our first objective was to uncover the latent geometric net-
work structure and to evaluate the suitability of a hyperbolic
network model. (See Methods for background on hyperbolic
geometry.) To this end, we calculated stress-minimizing em-
beddings of the financial networks N2014,N2016 and N2018
into two-dimensional Euclidean space E2 and hyperbolic
space H2. These methods correspond to classic multidimen-
sional scaling21 in the Euclidean case and to the hydra+
embedding method22, 23 in the hyperbolic case. The residual
stress can be used as a goodness-of-fit measure between
geometric model and true network topology. As shown in
Figure 1.B the residual embedding stress from the hyper-
bolic model is substantially smaller – consistently over all
three years of observation – than from the Euclidean model.
This indicates that the latent geometry of the observed fi-
nancial networks is much better represented by negatively
curved (hyperbolic) rather than flat (Euclidean) geometry.
It is also evidence of a high degree of hierarchical organi-
zation24 in the financial networks considered. Furthermore,
as a result of the embedding we obtain for each bank node
bi latent coordinates (ri,θi) in the Poincaré disc model of
hyperbolic space (see Methods), which allows us to con-
nect the network embedding to the popularity-vs-similarity
model of Papadopoulos et al.4 The hyperbolic embedding of the full banking network of 2018 is shown in Figure 2. The
embedded network shows a clear core-periphery structure, in line with previous studies of financial networks.25, 26 A deeper
analysis of this structure is the subject of the following section.
Structural Analysis
The popularity-vs-similarity model of Papadopoulos et al.4 offers a direct interpretation of the latent hyperbolic network
coordinates in the Poincaré disc in terms of their popularity dimension (the radial coordinate r) and the similarity dimension
(the angular coordinate θ ). In the context of financial networks, we hypothesized that the popularity dimension of a given bank
aligns with its systemic importance, and that its similarity dimension is associated with sub-sectors of the banking system, e.g.,
along geographic and regional divisions. Due to the asymmetric distribution of banks within the Poincaré disc (Figure 2), we
slightly adapt the model Papadopoulos et al.4 and calculate the geodesic polar coordinates (r′i,θ ′i ) with respect to the network
center-of-weight, rather than the center of the Poincaré disc; see Methods for details.
Rank 2014 2016 2018
1 Nordea * BNP Paribas * Groupe BPCE *
2 Royal Bank of Scotland * UniCredit * Barclays *
3 Barclays * ING Groep * Royal Bank of Scotland
4 Intesa Sanpaolo Deutsche Bank * Groupe Crédit Agricole *
5 UniCredit * Intesa Sanpaolo BNP Paribas *
Table 1. For each year the five banks with the highest hyperbolic centrality
(i.e. smallest r′ coordinate) are listed. Asterisks denote banks that are
considered globally systemic relevant institutions (G-SIBs)
To test the first hypothesis – the associa-
tion between radial coordinate r′ and systemic
importance – we labelled a bank as system-
ically important in a given year, whenever
it was included in the contemporaneous list
of global systemically important banks (G-
SIBs) as published by the Financial Stabil-
ity Board.27–29; see also Table 3. Using a
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test, we find a sig-
nificant association between radial rank and
systemic importance in all years (P2014 < .0001,
P2016 < .0001, P2018 = .0038). In Table 1 we
report the five top-ranked banks (most central
in terms of r′) for each year.
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Figure 2. Hyperbolic Embedding of the EBA Financial Network of 2018. Nodes are labelled by country and bank ID and
coloured according to region (see Table 3 for full names). Panel A shows the full network including the strongest links (top
decile), i.e., the connections with the largest liquidity-weighted portfolio overlap. Banks labelled as systemically important by
the Financial Stability Board (G-SIBs) are indicated by asterisks. The black cross marks the capital-weighted hyperbolic center
of the banking network. In panels B and C the Central/Eastern and the Nordic regional groups are highlighted to illustrate
regional clustering.
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To test the second hypothesis – the association between similarity dimension θ ′ and regional banking sub-sectors – we
assigned banks to the following nine regional groups:
Spain (ES), Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), UK and Ireland (UK/IE), Nordic Region (EE/NO/SE/DK/FI/IS),
Benelux Region (BE/NE/LU), Southern/Mediterranean (GR/CY/MT/PT), Central and Eastern Europe (AT/BG/HU/LV/RO/SI).
These regions are reasonably balanced in terms of the number of banks included in the EBA panel. Using ANOVA for circular
data [30, Sec. 7.4] we find a highly significant association between the angular coordinate θ ′ and the regional group in all
three years considered (P < .0001 in all years). This indicates that the peripheral community structure (away from the network
core) of the EBA financial network is indeed strongly aligned with geographic and regional divisions in Europe. We have
highlighted two different regional groups in Figure 2.B and 2.C to illustrate the association between angular coordinate and
regional structure.
Network structure over time
The longitudinal structure of the data set allows us to track changes in the network structure over the whole time span of
observations from 2014 to 2018. Note, however, that the samples of banks included by the EBA vary substantially in size and –
even when restricted to the smallest sample – are not completely overlapping; see Table 2. Nevertheless, the goodness-of-fit of
the hyperbolic model (reported in Figure 1.B) is surprisingly stable over all years. This suggests that the hyperbolic model does
indeed capture intrinsic qualities of the network, rather than relying on transitory structural artefacts.
Figure 3. Changes in radial coordinate r′ (low values indicate high
centrality) between 2014 and 2016 (A) and 2016 and 2018 (B). Banks
considered systemically relevant (G-SIBs) at the end of the time period are
marked in red. Nordea bank is circled in the panel A; see text for
background.
We proceed to analyze the temporal changes in
the latent radial coordinate r′ and angular coor-
dinate θ ′, corresponding to changes in systemic
importance and community structure. Note that
the small sample of banks included in the 2016
stress test restricts the number of banks that
are included in this longitudinal analysis, cf.
Table 2. The scatter plots in Figure 3 and the
corresponding Pearson’s correlations of .678
between 2014 and 2016 (P < .0001) and .569
between 2016 and 2018 (P = .0001) show a
clear positive association between hyperbolic
centrality in successive snap shots of the finan-
cial networks. In panel A of Figure 3, Nordea
bank can be identified as a clear outlier, mov-
ing from a very central position in 2014 to a pe-
ripheral position in 2016. Interestingly, Nordea
was one of just two banks (together with Royal
Bank of Scotland) which were removed from
the list of G-SIBs in the subsequent update in
2018 due to decreasing systemic importance.29
For the angular coordinate, we account for the circular nature of the variable and compute the circular correlation30 of the
angular coordinates between successive years. A moderate association between successive years can be observed at circular
correlation values of 0.211 between 2014 and 2016 (P = .1877) and 0.225 between 2016 and 2018 (P = 0.1385).
Discussion
Based on data from the EBA stress tests of 2014, 2016 and the transparency exercise of 2018, we have presented strong evidence
that the latent geometry of financial networks can be well-represented by geometry of negative curvature, i.e., by hyperbolic
geometry. Calculating stress-minimizing embeddings into the Poicaré disc model of hyperbolic geometry has allowed us to
visualize this geometric structure and to connect it to the popularity-vs-similarity model of Papdopoulos et al.4 We find that the
radial coordinate (‘popularity’) is strongly associated with systemic importance (as assessed by the Financial Stability Board)
and the angular coordinate (‘similarity’) with geographic and regional subdivisions. A longitudinal analysis shows that – in the
observation period from 2014 to 2018 – systemic importance of banks within the European banking network has stayed rather
stable and has been predominated by only gradual changes. The peripheral community structure has been more variable, but
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has remained strongly determined by geographical divisions in all years considered.
In future research we plan to study the interplay between hyperbolic network geometry and the dynamics of contagion processes.
We are confident, that the empirical analysis of latent network geometry in this paper can provide the basis for new analytic
models for the diffusion of financial stress in a banking network with hyperbolic structure.
Methods
Data Preparation and Inference of Financial Networks
The financial networks were extracted from three different publicly available data sets stemming from the stress tests (in 2014
and 2016) and the EU-wide transparency exercise (in 2018) of the European Banking Authority (EBA).12, 13 The data sets
contain detailed balance sheet information from all European banks (EU + Norway) included in the stress test/transparency
exercise of the EBA in the respective year. From these data sets we extracted the portfolio values of all sovereign bonds held by
the banks, split by issuing country (38 countries) and three levels of maturity (short: 0M-3M, medium: 3M-2Y, long: 2Y-10Y+),
resulting in m = 38×3 = 114 different asset classes.
2014 2016 2018
number of banks (n) 119 51 128
of which included in the subseq. year 43 41
Table 2. Sample sizes of EBA data sets
For each year, this data was stored as the weighted ad-
jacency matrix P (‘portfolio matrix’) of a bipartite network.
The n rows of P correspond to the banks in the sample, the
m columns to the different asset classes, and the element
Pik to the portfolio value (in EUR) of asset k in the balance
sheet of bank i. To perform a one-mode projection of this
bipartite network, we followed Cont and Wagalath20, 31 as
well as Cont and Schaanning19: We computed the liquidity-
weighted portfolio overlap (LWPO) of bank i and bank j as
Li j =
m
∑
k=1
PikPjk
dk
, (1)
where dk is the market depth for asset k.19 The LWPO measures the impact of a sudden liquidation of the portfolio of bank i on
the portfolio value of bank j and vice versa. Hence, it quantifies the risk of fire-sale contagion between the banks in a financial
stress scenario. The market depth of asset k was estimated from P as its total volume held by all banks in the sample, i.e., as
dk =∑ni=1 Pik. Writing D for the diagonal matrix of market depths, (1) can be succinctly written as matrix product L = PD−1P>.
Finally, we set the link weight wi j between bank bi and b j in the one-mode projection N of the banking network equal to the
normalized LWPO between banks bi and b j, i.e., wi j := Li j/maxi, j Li j
Background on hyperbolic geometry
The hyperboloid model
Hyperbolic geometry can be characterized as the geometry of a space of constant negative curvature, while the more familiar
Euclidean geometry is the geometry of a flat space, i.e. a space of zero curvature. In the hyperboloid model of hyperbolic
geometry32, 33, d-dimensional hyperbolic space Hd is defined as the hyperboloid
Hd =
{
x ∈ Rd+1 : x20− x21−·· ·− x2d = 1, x0 > 0
}
equipped with distance dH(x,y) = arcosh(x0y0− x1y1−·· ·− xdyd) .
In fact, Hd endowed with the Riemannian metric tensor ds2 = dx20−dx21−·· ·−dx2d is a Riemannian manifold and dH(x,y) is
the corresponding Riemannian distance.32, 33 The sectional curvature of this manifold is constant and equal to −1. Thus, Hd is
indeed a model of geometry of constant negative curvature.
The Poincaré disc model
While the hyperboloid model is convenient for computations, a more preferable (and popular) model for visualizations
in dimension d = 2 is the Poincaré disc model32, which also forms the basis of the popularity-vs-similarity model of
Papadopoulos et al.4. To obtain the Poincaré disc model, the hyperboloid H2 is mapped to the open unit disc (‘Poincaré disc’)
D=
{
z ∈ R2 : z21+ z22 < 1
}
, parameterized by polar coordinates as z1 = r cosθ , z2 = r sinθ , using the stereographic projection
(cf. [32, §4.2])
r =
√
x0−1
x0+1
, θ = atan’(x2,x1), x = (x0,x1,x2) ∈H2, (2)
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where atan’ is the quadrant-preserving arctangent.∗ In the Poincaré disc model, the hyperbolic distance becomes
dB((r1,θ1),(r2,θ2)) = arcosh
(
1+2
r21 + r
2
2 +2r1r2 cos(θ1−θ2)
(1− r21)(1− r22)
)
and geodesic lines are represented by arcs of (Euclidean) circles intersected with D.
Hyperbolic Embedding and Centering
Embedding into Hyperbolic Space
Network embedding methods aim to find – for each network node bi – latent coordinates xi in a geometric model space G, such
that the geodesic distance between xi and x j in G matches – as closely as possible – a given dissimilarity measure di j between
nodes bi and b j. Stress-minimizing embedding methods aim to minimize the stress functional
Stress(x1, . . . ,xn) =
√
1
n(n−1)∑i, j
(
dnetworki j −dgeomG (xi,x j)
)2
, (3)
which measures the root mean square error between given network dissimilarities and the corresponding distances in the
model space. For Euclidean geometry, this method is well-known as multidimensional scaling21, 34, or – using a weighted
stress functional – as Sammon mapping35. For hyperbolic space, i.e., when dgeomG = dH , several optimization methods for (3)
have been proposed22, 23, 36. We use the hydra+ method implemented in the package hydra for the statistical computing
environment R37.
Hyperbolic Centering
For a point cloud x1, . . . ,xn in Hd and non-negative weights w1, . . . ,wn summing to one, the hyperbolic mean30 or hyperbolic
center of weight38 can be determined as follows: Calculate the weighted Euclidean mean x¯ = ∑wixi, and its ‘resultant length’
ρ =
√
(x¯0)2− (x¯1)2−·· ·− (x¯d)2, which is a measure of dispersion for the point cloud. The hyperbolic center c is then
determined as c = x¯/ρ and is again an element of Hd . The point cloud can be centered at c by transforming each points as
(xi)′ = T−cxi, where Tc is the hyperbolic translation matrix (‘Lorentz boost’)
Tc =
(
c0 c¯>
c¯
√
Id + c¯c¯>
)
with c = (c0, c¯) = (c0,c1, . . . ,cd).
In dimension d = 2, the stereographic projection (2) may then be applied to convert the centered coordinates (xi)′ to centered
polar coordinates (r′i,θ ′i ) in the Poincaré disc.
Application to Financial Networks
The described methods were applied to the financial networks inferred from the EBA data as follows: We converted the
similarity weights wi j (normalized LWPO) to dissimilarities di j = 1−wi j. We embedded these similarities by minimizing the
stress functional (3), using the R-package hydra. For the resulting network embeddings, we calculated the capital-weighted
network center c as the weighted hyperbolic mean with weights wi proportional to the total capital ∑mk=1 Pik of bank i invested
in all assets a1, . . .am. After centering at the hyperbolic center c, we calculated the coordinates (r′i,θ ′i ) by the stereographic
projection (2).
Data Availability Statement
The data analysed during the current study are available from the website of the European Banking Authority at https://www.
eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing and https://eba.europa.eu/
risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-transparency-exercise/2018.
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IT07 Banca Popolare Dell’Emilia Romagna - Società Cooperativa
IT09 Banca Popolare di Sondrio
IT13 Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A.
IT16 Banco BPM Gruppo Bancario
IT17 Credito Emiliano Holding SpA
IT18 Iccrea Banca Spa Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo
LU01 Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat
LU02 Precision Capital S.A.
LU03 J.P. Morgan Bank Luxembourg S.A.
LU04 RBC Investor Services Bank S.A.
LU05 State Street Bank Luxembourg S.A.
MT01 Bank of Valletta plc
MT02 Commbank Europe Ltd
MT03 MDB Group Limited
NL01 Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten N.V.
NL02 Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A.
NL03 Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V.
NL07 ABN AMRO Group N.V.
NL08 ING Groep N.V. *
NL09 Volksholding B.V.
NO01 DNB Bank Group
NO02 SPAREBANK 1 SMN
NO03 SR-bank
PL01 PKO BANK POLSKI
PL07 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA
PT01 Caixa Geral de Depósitos
PT02 Banco Comercial Português
PT04 Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, CRL
PT05 Caixa Económica Montepio Geral, Caixa Económica Bancária SA
PT06 Novo Banco, SA
RO01 Banca Transilvania
SE01 Nordea Bank AB (publ) †
SE02 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (SEB)
SE03 Svenska Handelsbanken AB (publ)
SE04 Swedbank AB (publ)
SE05 Kommuninvest - group
SE06 Länsförsäkringar Bank AB - group
SE07 SBAB Bank AB - group
SI02 Nova Ljubljanska banka d. d.
SI04 Abanka d.d.
SI05 Biser Topco S.à.r.l.
UK01 Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc †
UK02 HSBC Holdings plc *
UK03 Barclays plc *
UK04 Lloyds Banking Group plc
UK05 Nationwide Building Society
UK06 Standard Chartered Plc *
Table 3. IDs and full names of banks in the 2018 EBA Network. Banks marked by asterisk (*) were G-SIBs in all years
(2014, 2016, 2018); banks marked by dagger (†) were G-SIBs in 2014 and 2016, but not in 2018.
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